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© Tamar Frankel     
D R A F T 
 
 Dismantling Large Bank Holding Companies 
For Their Own Good and For the Good of the Country 
 
Tamar Frankel 
 
Abstract  This paper suggests that bank holding companies are in fact “financial malls.” I demonstrates the 
problems that they pose for the financial system, not only by size but by inefficient and inappropriate 
concentration. The article suggests restructuring of bank holding companies by introducing more market 
discipline to the various “shops” in the mall as well as concentrating services for the purpose of efficiency. 
The Article concludes with suggestion that rather than imposing a restructure by law it may perhaps be 
possible to entice managements that look to the long-term future to follow a restructure voluntarily.  
 
Introduction 
 
Among the 2008 losses incurred by the various financial intermediaries are the serious 
losses suffered by mammoth bank holding companies (BHCs).These losses have given 
rise anew to proposed tightening of bank regulation.1 However, there is little agreement 
on the necessity or the nature of additional regulation.2 The suggestion of splitting up 
Citi, the third largest banking holding company, seems to have been more difficult than 
the proponents envisioned. The chances of doing that soon are quite low.3  
 
These statements do not suggest that only BHCs have caused the financial crisis in 2008. 
The contributors are far too numerous and the balance of responsibility among them too 
difficult to compute.4 However, whether or not BHCs have contributed their share to the 
disaster, they cost the citizens of the United States trillions of dollars in “bailouts.” To be 
sure, five years later, in 2013 the treasury is planning to sell most of the TARP banks.5 In 
the meantime the harm was done and has not been repaired as yet.   
 
                                                 
 Professor of Law, Michaels Research Scholar, Boston Unviersity Law School. 
1 See 9 Banks in Major Holding Company Fail, CNNMONEY.COM, Oct. 30, 2009, 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/30/news/economy/fbop_failure/index.htm (last visited June 12, 2012) 
(“FBOP's banks in California, Illinois, Texas and Arizona bring the number of '09 failures to 115. 
Depositors insured up to $250,000.”); Richard W. Fisher and .Harvey Rosenblum, How to Shrink the “Too-
Big-to-Fail Banks, Wall St. J. A17, March 11, 2013.  
2  For a proposal to restructure the regulatory system see Latest CCMR Study Shows Decline in U.S. Share 
of Global Markets in 2011, PR NEWSWIRE, June 4, 2012, LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. 
3 Wall Street,l Feb. 21, 2013 C1, C2 (Citi’s Chairman, who advocated such splitting is finding it difficult: 
Deciding who will retain the banking licenses, the funding of a stand-alone investment bank, winding up 
legal structures of “thousands of entities,” notwithstanding the cries of analysts and the regulators to split 
the giant bank holding company and notwithstanding the fall of its stock and its $700 billion a year in U.S. 
government  subsidies. Ego and power is much of the glue that keeps these banks together)  
4 The Securities and Exchange Commission was blamed for sleeping at the wheel. TIME Magazine Photos 
Videos; Sponsored Links Money Fund 2a7 Compliance. 
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1843519,00.html#ixzz24asQsogS 
5 Jefferey Sparshott, U.S. to Sell Bulk Of TARP Banks, Wall Street J. December 18, 2012, at C-3.  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2238173
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I argue that the source of the BHCs’ problems is neither lax rules, nor the rules’ weak 
enforcement. Rather, most of BHCs’ problems stem from, and relate to, their structure.6 
Therefore I propose to restructure BHCs: Their subsidiaries should exchange their shares 
with the shares of the BHC held by investors. Thus, the general services of the BHCs 
should become subsidiaries of the BHCs’ former subsidiaries and convert into a service 
company. This company would provide to each of the former subsidiaries the general 
services that all subsidiaries need, such as accounting, legal advice, preparing 
prospectuses, communicating with public shareholders, and advertising. Restructuring in 
this manner can create more efficient and less toxic financial conglomerates, and 
introduce stronger market controls, which have been sorely missing. Further, this type of 
structuring should be voluntary. Those who wish to create or recreate a BHC of this sort 
should be permitted to do so. 
 
The outline of this paper is as follows: Part one examines the nature of BHCs. I observe 
that most of BHCs reflect the entire or significant parts of, the financial system. They are 
similar to financial malls. Part two lists the significant and dangerous disadvantages of 
the existing BHCs model and notes that the regulation of BHCs’ risk-taking is 
ineffective. Part three offers a way to protect this country from the risks taken by the 
large BHC financial malls. In this part I respond to some possible arguments that 
question my proposal in defense of my proposal.  
 
ONE:      Bank holding companies are not banks  
 
1. What we call large BHCs are not banks. Some BHCs may hold subsidiaries 
that function as banks. One BHC, Washington Mutual., owned various types of banks as 
subsidiaries. Its management aimed for this HBS to become the “Wal-Mart of banking,”7 
until it imploded in a most spectacular and memorable manner.8 However, most BHCs 
are “financial malls,” containing a variety of financial “shops” that offer various financial 
intermediation services. These shops include securities brokers-dealers and underwriters, 
managers and advisers of mutual funds, trust funds, and wealthy individual, banks proper, 
insurance companies, creators and sellers of asset-backed securities, and traders for the 
BHCs’ own account, guarantors, traders in securities’ collateral held for customers and 
various instruments of risk exchanges, and more.  
 
2. How are large BHCs financial malls structured? Currently, a BHC owns the 
financial shops in a mall. It owns the shares of all the shops in the mall.9 The BHC 
collects the revenues from the various shops and raises funds by issuing its securities to 
                                                 
6 I am not the only one who made this observation. See the arguments of Professor Henry Hu in the article 
by Gillian Tett, Financial Times, The banks that are too complex to exist Last updated, June 7, 2012. 10:19. 
7 See Peter S. Goodman & Gretchen Morgenson, Saying Yes to Anyone, WaMu Built Future on Shaky 
Loans,  N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2008, at 1  (quoting chief executive of Washington Mutual stating that 
“[bank] hope[d] to do to [the banking] industry what Wal-Mart did to theirs”). 
8  Robin Sidel et al., WaMu Is Seized, Sold Off to J.P. Morgan, in Largest Failure in U.S. Banking History, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, LEXIS, News Library, Wsj File; . 
9 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 258 (2010) 
(stating that in a bank holding company, “[m]ajor strategic decisions are taken at the holding company 
level, and the incentive pay of the top executives is tied to the share price of the holding company”).  
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the public. The managements of the BHCs distribute funds to the shops and determine 
how, and how much, to reward the shops’ managers. More importantly, the variety and 
inter-connectedness of the shops make it difficult for the BHCs’ managements to manage 
their complex and varied shops especially if the shops closely reflect the entire financial 
system.10 The inability to control this mélange of intermediation activities manifests 
itself, from time to time by enormous risks which the BHCs and their subsidiary shops 
incur. Thus, BHCs can produce periodically enormous gains and enormous losses.11  
 
3.       The structure of large BHCs differs from other types of holding companies. 
For example, BHC structures differ from a business mall in which the mall-owners meet 
the necessary needs and offer the necessary services that all the shops need and the shops 
in the mall are owned by different persons and organizations. In such a mall the 
regulators of each shop address the shop management directly. If one shop is a pharmacy,  
and the other is a restaurant, each regulator addresses the shop managers directly rather 
than the owner of the entire mall properties.  
 
BHC organizational structure differs from the structure of mutual funds whose advisers 
own the organization that services each fund, but each fund is owned by investors. These 
investors determine whether their funds have performed to their satisfaction. These 
investors can decimate their fund if they are displeased with its performance by 
redeeming their shares and forcing it to close (unless other investors have a different view 
of the fund’s performance).12 
 
BHC structure differs from Vanguard’s structure, a unique mutual fund complex, and the 
largest in the Untied States todate.  The difference is worth noting. In the Vanguard mall, 
the shops— the various funds entities — and their investors -- own the mall, and pay for 
its services. Thus, each fund owns shares in the service-giver, such as the trading desk, 
sales force, accounting and legal services, to name a few. This structure is more efficient 
because it reduces the cost of duplicate service to the investors in each fund.  
 
However, as to performance, each fund “sits on its own bottom.” Its performance is 
judged by its shareholders, not by a holding company management, or the holding 
company’s shareholders. The power to reward a fund’s management is vested in its 
shareholders, rather than in the BHC’s management. The funds’ shareholders regulate the 
                                                 
10 E.g., BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 20, http://media.corporate-
ir.net/Media_Files/IROL/71/71595/AR2011.pdf (last visited June 12, 2012) (noting that Bank of America 
Corporation is a bank holding company and financial holding company “provid[ing] a diversified range of 
banking and nonbanking financial services” through subsidiaries); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, 
Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 258 (2010) (“Citibank . . . is a subsidiary of Citigroup, which 
combines traditional consumer and commercial banking with investment banking, wealth management, and 
alternative investments such as private equity, hedge funds, and structured products.”) (citing Citigroup 
financials and Form 10-K). 
11 E.g., the J.P. Morgan 2 Billion Dollars (and may be more) losses reported in Wall Street Journal on May 
15, 2012 and the moves take to protect its CEO James Dimon. Dan Fitzpatrick & Joann S. Lublin, J.P. 
Morgan Moves to Protect Dimon, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2012, at A1, LEXIS, News Library, Wsj File 
(noting that board still backs CEO and will not strip him of chairmanship). 
12 A closed-end investment company can take a longer time to fail, but it too will fail if the share prices of 
the fund fall by lower trading and low valuation of the managements’ performance. See 
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funds, whose shares they own. They may usually regulate the funds by redeeming or 
selling their shares or refusing to buy the funds’ shares. In these circumstances both the 
funds’ managements and their owned servicers take notice of the market signals and take 
steps to change their behavior, or fail—as they should. Needless to say, their failure does 
not shake the economy nor borne by the country’s taxpayers.  
 
TWO:  BHC structural model raises serious disadvantages for their investors, and 
the financial system, against which current regulation does not effectively protect 
 
1.    The larger BHCs are, the more risk they pose by their interaction with similar 
large BHCs.  These interbank interaction and interbank markets might create domino 
effects. The failure of one or few is likely to raise risks for the entire financial system. If 
even one bad apple is sufficiently larch, such a domino effect can cause the good apples 
to rot.  
 
One study of financial services’ conglomeration noted the interbank markets. To be sure, 
there are positive values to such markets “for the proper functioning of modern financial 
systems. However, a network of interbank exposures may lead to domino effects 
following the event of an initial bank failure.”13 The study reviewed the contagion risk 
for the Belgian banking system over the period 1993–2002 and found that “an increase in 
the relative importance of cross-border interbank exposures has lowered local contagion 
risk” but may have increased the contagion risk brought by foreign banks.14 Similarly, in 
the case of BHCs, while each shop in the mall might benefit from the contagion, each 
shop may also be exposed to the risks taken by other shops in the mall or by the mall in 
its entirety.  
 
The current proposed regulations and restructures of large BHCs are ineffective to avoid 
this domino effect even within one BHC. America’s bank supervisors conduct 
comprehensive inspections of BHCs and assign them a supervisory rating, known as a 
BOPEC rating. Before 2005, these rating reflected the BHCs’ overall condition.15 The 
                                                 
13Hans Degryse & Grégory Nguyen, Interbank Exposures: An Empirical Examination of Contagion Risk in 
the Belgian Banking System, INT’L J. CENTRAL BANKING, June 2007, at 123, 123, 
www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb07q2a5.htm (last visited May 17, 2012).  
14Hans Degryse & Grégory Nguyen, Interbank Exposures: An Empirical Examination of Contagion Risk in 
the Belgian Banking System, INT’L J. CENTRAL BANKING, June 2007, at 123, 123, 
www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb07q2a5.htm (last visited May 17, 2012) (emphasis added).   
15 John Krainer & Jose A. Lopez, Using Securities Market Information for Bank Supervisory Monitoring, 
INT’L J. CENTRAL BANKING, Mar. 2008, at 125, 125, http://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb08q1a4.htm (last 
visited May 17, 2012) (“An empirical model of these BOPEC ratings combined “supervisory and securities 
market information. [The model demonstrated that] [s]ecurities market variables, such as stock returns and 
bond yield spreads, improve the model's in-sample fit. Debt market variables provide more information on 
supervisory ratings for banks closer to default, while equity market variables provide useful information on 
ratings for banks further from default. The out-of-sample accuracy of the model with securities market 
variables is little different from that of a model based on supervisory variables alone. However, the model 
with securities market information identifies additional ratings downgrades, which are of particular 
importance to bank supervisors who are concerned with systemic risk and contagion.”). 
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evaluation concluded that “the proposed regulations are not optimal in meeting the 
danger of the domino effect on the financial system.”16  
 
2.     Bank regulation and regulator fail to control BHC risk-taking. They are not 
very effective in reducing “deposit-insurance-related moral hazard” such as “cash-
asset reserve requirements, risk-sensitive capital requirements and deposit insurance 
premia, and bank closure policy.”17  
Moreover, regulators fail to “examine the impact of the competitive environment (bank 
charter value) and industry structure (scope of banks) on these moral hazards. [They] also 
examine the implications of banking theory for alternatives to deposit insurance.”18 In 
addition, so long as large BHCs are classified as banks, their regulators are uniquely 
unsuitable to examine, supervise and regulate all the different types of financial shops in 
these large BHCs, except the units that engage in banking intermediation. For example, 
while investment advisers to individuals and mutual funds are regulated as fiduciaries, 
banks are regulated as contract parties, subject to strict regulation which aims at 
maintaining the entities “safety and soundness.” That is—the more they earn the better 
regulated they are. Less attention is paid to HOW they earn and at whose account. 
 
3.    Researchers have argued that banks’ “underwriting practices are the primary 
determinant of bank credit risk and bank credit availability. For this reason, U.S. 
bank supervisors conduct periodic surveys to assess bank underwriting practices and their 
level of riskiness. In early 1995 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
introduced a comprehensive examination questionnaire, or survey, of bank underwriting 
practices at FDIC-supervised banks. . . . The survey cover[ed] lending practices both in 
general and in specific loan categories [and] investigate[d] (1) the relationships between 
examiners’ assessments of the riskiness of bankers' lending practices and subsequent 
changes in bank condition, and (2) the question of whether these relationships can 
enhance supervisors’ early-warning systems.” The investigators found “that higher 
(lower) risk in underwriting practices is associated with subsequent increases (decreases) 
in nonperforming assets generally” and “that assessments of underwriting risk contribute 
to off-site surveillance models that predict safety and-soundness examination ratings. 
However, this conclusion is largely subsumed by that of concurrent safety-and-soundness 
examinations ratings. Thus, underwriting survey data are best used as diagnostic 
measures of the sources of financial distress.”19  These measures seem to apply to banks. 
The question is whether they are appropriate to BHCs.  
 
Bank concentration and bank frailty were examined in 2005. The authors “[found] no 
support for the view that concentration increases the fragility of banks,” but the contrary: 
                                                 
16 Id. 
17 Sudipto Bhattacharya et al., The Economics of Bank Regulation, 30 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 745, 
745 (1998).    
18 Id, at 745-70. 
19 John O’Keefe et al., Bank Loan-Underwriting Practices: Can Examiners’ Risk Assessments Contribute to 
Early-Warning Systems? (Working Paper No. 2003-06, 2003), 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/working/wp2003_06/wp2003_06.pdf  (last visited May 17, 2012). 
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“concentration [was] associated with a lower probability that the country suffers a 
systemic banking crisis. In terms of policies, [they found] that . . . regulations 
[facilitating] competition in banking [were] associated with less -- not more -- banking 
system fragility and [did not result in] concentration. [They suggest] that concentration is 
a proxy for something else besides the competitive environment. [Neither did they find] 
that official capital regulations, reserve requirements, or official prudential regulations 
lower crises probabilities. [They offered] suggestive evidence that concentrated banking 
systems tend to have larger, better-diversified banks, which may help account for the 
positive link between concentration and stability.” 20 It is doubtful whether the praise for 
bank concentration and related stability would survive the added facts since 2005 and the 
price that the country has been paying for their concentration.  
In September 2007 risk assessment continued to be noted as an important protection 
against failure of financial institutions. One insurance executive noted: “A thorough 
assessment of risks and risk management strategies allows the insurance company’s risk 
manager to perform robust analyses to support strategic decisions.” Insurance company 
risk managers today need to “identify[], assess[], prioritiz[e], control[], financ[e], and 
monitor[] . . . natural hazards, shareholder lawsuits,  . . . the theft or destruction of critical 
data,” and other risks that confront the enterprise. The need for a thorough risk 
assessment to assess profit potential and establish sustainable rates is discussed.21 Risk 
assessment for banks has occupied other researchers as well.22 They did, however, note 
that new “trading products” may require special risk assessment. 23 A year later, they may 
have emphasized this point louder. In sum, risk assessment has been occupying both 
regulators and researchers, but assessments did not seem to have had a preventive effect 
on the events of 2008. 
 
3. The regulation of BHCs’ mall structure reflects the weakness of their 
regulation. Among the mall’s shops are institutional intermediaries, such as banks, 
mutual funds, and insurance companies as well as market intermediaries, such as 
underwriters and broker-dealers. In addition, BHCs own entities that create securities, 
                                                 
20 Thorsten Beck et al., Bank Concentration and Fragility: Impact and Mechanics (NBER Working Paper 
No. 11500, 2005), http://www.nber.org/papers/w11500.pdf?new_window=1 (last visited May 17, 2012); 
Thorsten Beck et al., Bank Concentration and Fragility: Impact and Mechanics, in THE RISKS OF 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 193 (R. Carey & R.M. Stulz eds., 2006). 
21 John J. Kollar, Conduct a Thorough Risk Assessment, BUS. INS., Sept. 3, 2007, at 28, LEXIS, News 
Library, Arcnws File. 
22 Craig Focardi, Recalibrating Loan Risk Assessment,  MORTGAGE BANKING, Aug. 1, 2007, at 105 (lenders 
can improve their profit margins and gain a competitive advantage in spite of slowing home-price 
appreciation and rising delinquencies by refining their risk-assessment policies and recalibrating their 
information technology tools. Some of the new tools and approaches that lenders can use to assess the 
probability of default and other mortgage risks are discussed.). 
23Curtis Knight & Francis Garritt, Best Practices for Risk Analysis and Approval of New Trading Products, 
RMA J., Mar. 2008, at 34 (although risk analysis of new trading products or activities is an often-lengthy 
process for financial institutions, there are ways to streamline it. In order to ensure that risk is identified, 
captured, and managed, risk managers must ensure that the objectives and new-product introduction 
process are transparent and that the appropriate degree of due diligence is conducted. Details are provided 
on how to streamline the tedious process of careful risk analysis of new trading products or activities, and a 
table lists business unit responsibilities and market risk responsibilities). 
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offer guarantees of various types and cover risks of various types. Two main regulators 
regulate these shops. Their approach, the laws they must enforce, and their views of the 
functions they regulate, differ significantly. 
 
The focus of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is on disclosure of market 
intermediaries and fiduciary duties of advisers to investors. Bank regulators focus on the 
“safety and soundness” of the banks. While the focus of the SEC regulation is the 
protection of investors, the focus of the bank regulators is on protection of the banks’ 
safety, and indirectly the protection of the FDIC, which aims indirectly to protect the 
depositors, which aims indirectly to protect the banks by preventing the depositors’ run 
on the banks. The SEC and the laws it administers are not concerned with the safety and 
soundness of either market intermediaries or the advisers and managers of mutual funds. 
If the fiduciaries are less profitable—that is their business, not the regulators’ concern. 
Their focus is on the protection of investors from the possible misappropriation by the 
people who hold and manage the investors’ money.24 Enforcement of the law is not 
necessarily by the SEC. The SEC may perform an investigation or may allow another 
company to perform an internal investigation. But in that case it will “test and probe and 
verify to see whether or not that investigation is thorough and independent.”25 Arguably, 
the SEC is concerned with the investors’ trust in the securities markets. To that extent the 
reputation of a large investment banks or funds may involve the SEC’s concern. But even 
in that case the concern is about the market system rather than the well being or 
profitability of a particular large fund. 
 
Consequently, the laws, purposes, and interpretational approaches of the two regulating 
agencies differ in fundamental ways. The regulators of the two types of agencies are 
differently raised, and trained. They define the regulation’s objective and the differently. 
For example, when a bank regulator supervising the bank’s management of trust accounts 
and mutual funds was asked for the purpose of his supervision he answered that his main 
purpose was to protect the bank’s reputation. Safety and soundness reared its head even 
in this highly regulated fiduciary law duty area. The regulator of the bank as trustee 
aimed at protecting the bank’s trustee reputation and business. Presumably, the purposes 
of both regulators coincide to the extent that the benefits to trust beneficiaries and to a 
trustee bank coincide. But in a case of a conflict, such as when the bank charges 
beneficiaries more than competitors do and the beneficiaries have no recourse against the 
overcharge, the bank regulator may seek ways to protect the bank’s reputation as well as 
the banks higher fees and diluted fiduciary duties. “Maintenance of the bank’s 
reputation” is the important regulatory aim.  
                                                 
24 United States Securities and Exchange Commission, The Investor's Advocate: 
How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited May 22, 2012) (“The mission of the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and 
facilitate capital formation.”). 
25 David S. Hilzenrath, Probes of Firms Rely on Companies’ Own Legwork, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, May 
23, 2011, at A01, LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (noting also that internal investigations are often 
conducted by former Department of Justice and SEC employees).  
 8
 
It is interesting that the SEC has received scathing criticisms of its failure to regulate and 
prevent the 2008 crash,26 on the one hand, and for its failure to justify its regulation, on 
the other hand.27 Its name is linked to the debacle of 2008. In December 2007, for 
example, an article headed “Is the SEC a Tough Enough Watchdog?”28 noted that the 
SEC should “refocus its attention and overcome two key challenges. First, the SEC 
currently utilizes its valuable resources to ensure that accounting standards are followed. 
This effort does not seem to leave sufficient resources to enhance disclosures in areas that 
are critical to investors. The second challenge is that accounting standards have, until 
recently, centered on historical information. If the SEC is going to achieve its mission of 
protecting investors by providing valuable information, it also needs to emphasize the 
quality of disclosures related to forward-looking information.”29 The two conservative 
members of the Commission today are as vehement about the need to prove beyond any 
doubt by specific numbers, stories and histories and anything else possible to justify any 
added rules, regardless of the events that brought about the 2008 crash and regardless of 
Congressional directives.30  
 
In contrast, and surprisingly, one hears little criticism of the bank regulators, even though 
it seemed that the main drain on the citizens’ resources after the 2008 crash was the result 
of steps taken to save large bank holding companies rather than the small brokers, dealers 
and even larger underwriters. Needless to say, the government did not support one large 
investment banker31 whose failure may have contributed to the panic of 2008.  
 
Regardless of assigning blame—there is enough to go around—quite clearly the SEC 
does not have the political support, the power and the money that the bank regulators 
have. And while the SEC has been suing the large investment banks and investment 
bankers and brokers that arguably violated the law, bank regulators have not sued even a 
single bank or banker or bank holding company that received handouts from this 
country’s citizens to support the holding companies from failing.32 
 
                                                 
26 E.g., Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2011, at A1, 
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (noting Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission finding that SEC “failed 
to require big banks to hold more capital”).   
27 E.g., Floyd Norris, A Regulator, A Lawmaker, A Quandary,  N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2011, at B1, LEXIS, 
News Library, Curnws File (noting criticism of “burdensome SEC regulations”). 
28 Victor Valdivia, Is the SEC a Tough Enough Watchdog?, CPA J., Dec. 2007, at 24. 
29 Id. at 31. 
30 See, e.g., Mark Schoeff Jr., Schapiro on Political Hot Seat, INV. NEWS, May 7, 2012, at 16, LEXIS, 
News Library, Curnws File (noting expected opposition from Republican Commissioners Paredes and 
Gallagher to money market reform). 
31 E.g., Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Lehman's Demise Triggered Cash Crunch Around Globe --- Decision to 
Let Firm Fail Marked a Turning Point in Crisis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2008, at A1, LEXIS, News Library, 
Wsj File (noting reasons for Lehman Brothers’ demise and that government allowed firm to fail but 
propped up other firms). 
32 E.g., SEC Enforcement Actions: A Look at 2011 and What to Expect in the Next Year. MONDAQ, Mar. 5, 
2012, LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (noting recent enforcement actions). 
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It should be noted that bank regulators have fought to expand bank business for many 
years. In 1916 a bank regulator demanded to allow banks to issue insurance policies.33 
After the Glass-Steagall Act prohibition on banks’ engagement in the markets, bank 
regulators have been the best and most ferocious advocates for repealing the barrier. They 
found ways to expand the banks’ market activities abroad when the Supreme Court struck 
down the Comptroller’s permission for the banks to reenter the market intermediation in 
a somewhat round about way.34 Banking could not have and does not have today a better 
advocate, lobbyist and sales organization than their regulators.  
 
In sum, banks’ regulation and the securities market differ in purpose and regulatory 
focus. The SEC’s center of attention is the secondary and primary securities markets.35 
Bank regulators concentrate on the financial money markets and money supply.36 While 
bank regulators focus on the banks’ investments and their financial stability, the SEC has 
been focusing more intensely on the broker dealers and sales offices services to 
investors.37 While securities acts mandate the protection of investors by disclosure and 
intermediaries duties for the protection of investors, bank regulation aims first and 
foremost at the protection of banks’ “safety and soundness,” which indirectly leads to the 
protection of the FDIC, which is designed to protect the depositors, and preventing the 
depositors’ run on banks.  
 
                                                 
33 Letter from John Skelton Williams, Comptroller of the Currency to Sen. Robert Owen, reprinted in 53 
Cong. Rec. 11,001(1916), cited in Scott A. Sinder, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and State Regulation of 
the Business of Insurance,  Past, Present and . . . Future?, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 49, 56 (2001). 
34 Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Frederick W. Gerkens, Note, Opportunities for 
Regulatory Arbitrage Under the European Economic Community’s Financial Services Directives and 
Related United States Regulations, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 455, 460 (1996) (noting that 
“Federal Reserve Board . . . Regulation K has been relaxed to expand the scope of permitted banking 
activities abroad”); Regulation K, 12 U.S.C. pt. 211 (2012) (governing international banking operations).  
35 United States Securities and Exchange Commission, The Investor's Advocate: 
How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited May 22, 2012) (“The mission of the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and 
facilitate capital formation.”). 
36 See UNITED STATES FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES & 
FUNCTIONS 1 (9th ed. 2005), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf (last visited May 21, 
2012) (duties of Federal Reserve include conducting monetary policy, regulating banking institutions to 
ensure safety and soundness of banking and financial system, and maintaining stability of financial 
system). 
37 Rachel McTague, Risk-Based Examinations to Look More Often at Brokerage Sales Offices, SEC Official 
Says, 83 Banking Rep. (BNA) 755 (Nov. 15, 2004) (“Banking Report Volume 83 Number 18 (Risk-Based 
Examinations to Look More Often at Brokerage Sales Offices, SEC Official Says The Securities and 
Exchange Commission's examinations staff will inspect broker-dealer sales offices more often under its 
new risk-based system, John Walsh, chief counsel in the SEC's Office of Compliance Inspections and 
Examinations (OCIE), said Nov. 5. (“Speaking at an American Law Institute-American Bar Association 
conference on life insurance company products, Walsh said that the staff will continue to conduct surprise 
exams, ‘"particularly of those sales offices.’" In October, Lori Richards, director of OCIE, said that the 
risk-targeted, in-depth examinations conducted by SEC compliance staff in the past year have yielded a 
greater number of referrals to the agency's Enforcement Division.”).  
 10
Expanded bank services and relaxed regulation went hand in hand. As noted, while the 
regulation of the markets is based mainly on disclosure, the regulation of the institutional 
investors is based mainly on substantive regulation. And yet, when the market door 
opened to these institutions the assumption was that substantive regulation should be 
reduced. The “market will take care of problems.” Indeed it did. 
 
4.   Large BHCs defy effective management for two reasons. BHCs are complex, 
varied, and engaged in financial transactions around the globe. Risky transactions are 
therefore hard to identify in time. In addition, BHCs’ managements are subjected to 
conflicting pressures. One source of BHC financing is bank deposits, insured by the 
government and subject to restrictions on banks’ risk taking. Its other source of financing 
is the BHC investors. They demand “performance,” which might involve higher risks.  
 
In 2004 it was suggested that the culture of large banks is unique: “hierarchical, 
bureaucratic and slow-moving organisations (sic) dominated by a ‘silo’ mentality in 
which individual units look to their own political interests rather than that of the bank as a 
whole.” The banks focused on not only the customers’ needs but on maximizing the 
bank’s profitability by providing an integrated service package to the clients.38 These 
banks were pressed to meet their investors’ demands for higher revenues. This pressure 
may raise “the likelihood of unethical or unwise credit or market risk judgements.(sic)”39  
It may drive banks to finance companies such as Enron, which failed.  
 
In addition “managing size and complexity has become a key management issue as 
institutions like Citigroup and HSBC, with hundreds of thousands of employees and 
hundreds of operating units across the globe, have become a new model of universal 
banking.”  Of the nine selected large banks that researchers examined, four believed they 
were truly committed to the clients’ interests.40 However, that was in 2004.  
 
In 2008 it transpired that conflicts of interest and other issues arose in such banks as well. 
The researchers concluded: “Sadly, we believe that the pressures from competitors, 
investors, and internal resistance to change will limit to a small handful the number of 
banks which can truly lay claim to the status of one bank built around a culture of 
customer service.”41  
 
In fact, there is a raging bloodletting current debate on whether and to what extent BHCs 
should be allowed to trade in the securities markets for their own account. The “Volker 
Rule” would prohibit or limit such trading. BHCs’ managements and some regulators 
vehemently object.42 Until the beginning of 2013, the Volker Rule has remained a 
                                                 
38 Steven Davis, Culture in Banking, ACCOUNTANCY IRELAND, Oct. 2004, at 15, 15, 
http://www.dibc.co.uk/culture_in_banking.pdf (last visited June 12, 2012). 
39 Id. at 16.  
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 17. 
42 The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203-H.R. 4173, signed 
into law on July 21, 2010.  The rule prohibits proprietary trading not at the request of clients. The rules has 
not been enforced by January 1 2013; Edward G. Eisert* As Volcker Rule Implementation Lumbers On – 
Some Practical Considerations Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, eeisert@orrick.com 
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directive to the regulators to be implemented, but has not been put in effect. The fact that 
BHC and their regulators are fighting so hard against it helps evaluate the rule’s reduction 
in the benefits and power of the BHC management and their regulators. When the door to  
money from market investors is shut, so will the power. 
Similarly, the Frank-Todd Act tightened the provisions of section 23A of the Banking 
Act, which limited bank interaction with affiliates. However, the beginning of the year 
2013 saw no guide by the Federal Reserve Board on how to implement the congressional 
directives. It seems that the congressional act is a dead letter until the Federal Reserve 
Board provides the guidelines. 
 
5.     Would the human side in BHC fare better or as importantly as the attention 
paid to risk management? In The Human Side of Risk, the authors noted: “The key to 
managing financial reporting exposures often lies” in the people who implement the 
controls. “The best-designed, best-operated, most flawless control” is only as good as the 
employee who implements it. Problems occur when the employee does not know--or 
perhaps even care--how to operate the control; does not read the output correctly; or 
deliberately manipulates the financial report's findings. In order to stop these problems 
from occurring, internal auditors need to pay close attention to the “real-world actions . . . 
taken by real-life employees in addressing the day-to-day duties of their jobs.” Advice is 
provided for internal auditors on identifying, assessing, and addressing the human 
element of risk as it relates to financial reporting.43 
 
After the crash of 2008, attention and consideration of this aspect of bank regulation has 
risen. Banks, it was discovered, are organizations that consist of people. The banking 
institutions are mere organizations that function as well or as badly as the people who 
manage them and work in them. The regulation of large BHCs reflects the structure of 
these entities that is the relationships among the managers and people who work there.  
 
As noted, among the mall’s shops are both institutional intermediaries, such as banks, 
mutual funds, and insurance companies, as well as market intermediaries, such as 
underwriters and broker-dealers, as well as entities that create securities, offer guarantees 
of various types and cover risks of various types. When the incentives of the actors are 
skewed; when they receive bonuses on short-term rising market prices; when they are not 
controlled in their risk-taking and encouraged to produce “untested innovations,” they 
will be driven to churn the markets, to take high risks with other people’s money, and to 
forget that they are risking the citizens’ money.  
 
In fact the people who managed and lost other people’s savings did not withdraw from 
management. They blamed others for the plight of the country.44 These attitudes tell us 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
43 Russell Jackson, The Human Side of Risk, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Oct. 2007, at 38. 
44 See, e.g., Charles Riley, Dimon: JPMorgan Traders Didn’t Understand Risks, CNNMONEY.COM, June 
12, 2012, LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (noting that CEO planned to blame loss primarly on 
“personnel and activities of the chief investment office”). 
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something about their view of their own obligations and responsibilities and the effect of 
the exercise of power or self-restraint and honest self-evaluation.   
 
Part four.   What should be done to protect the country from the risks taken by the 
large BHC malls? What solutions will this proposal offer? 
 
1. A proposal. I propose to eliminate the concentrated management power of BHCs 
and raise their investors’ power and market judgment. We can retain the benefits of 
BHCs and eliminate their disastrous effects. To reduce duplication, let the holding 
company become a servicer to its current subsidiaries. In addition, if collaboration among 
the various units is beneficial, such as offering investors combined services to a “full 
service” package, this collaboration should be facilitated and legal.  
 
Let the shareholders of each subsidiary (shop in the mall) choose its management, 
judge its performance, and regulate it by market forces. The subsidiary may be a 
bank, a mutual fund or an underwriter. Let the bank in the BHC mall be regulated as the 
bank outside the mall is being regulated. Let any other financial shop in the mall be 
regulated by the appropriate regulator free of the influence of other regulators.  
 
2. The benefits of restructure 
 
First, a restructured BHC resolves the issue or reduces the danger of the few BHCs 
that are “too big to fail.” The failure of these BHCs poses a threat to the entire 
financial system. The chance of failure of all the shops in the mall is far lower than the 
chance of failure of the holding company, especially since each shop is engaged in a 
different, and sometimes competing financial intermediation. The problem of conflict of 
interest within the BHC current structure will be reduced to a great extent, as each unit 
tends to compete with the other. The problem of faulty controls over the various units in 
the BHC will be reduced or resolved since the units will be more homogeneous and 
smaller, and therefore easier to control and manage. The problem of concentrated and 
toxic power currently in the BHC will be resolved by competition and cooperation on the 
issue of services.  
 
This solution also helps resolve or reduce the problem of managements’ control 
limitations. There comes a point when the “too big to fail” is truly “too big to manage.” 
Breaking up BHCs into their unique services allows for a far more effective management, 
not only in risk controls and prudent innovations, but also in profitable services. It 
facilitates focusing on investors’ and customers’ needs and balances the two groups’ 
desires. It helps create an appropriate service culture within each unit and the service 
organization as well. Restructuring the BHCs is likely to open the door to a more 
effective market discipline over each of the shops in the BHC financial mall. Most 
importantly, restructure might help encourage more diverse and less concentrated 
regulation, vesting power in regulators who know more about specific parts of the 
financial system rather than concentrating on their view of non-fiduciary banks. 
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Second, a restructured BHC facilitates and increases the markets’ regulation. Our 
Congress and regulators have moved the financial system to the markets in the belief that 
markets judge the performance of financial intermediaries and regulate them better than 
government regulators. This belief may be questioned, but it is still deep in the bowels of 
the banks, of many regulators and legislators. If so, and if we believe that banks should 
be the mall of the financial system, let us give the shops in the mall direct access to the 
markets, and most importantly, let the markets have direct regulatory power over the 
shops in the mall. 
 
To be sure, this proposal is based on faith in the markets. In this case, performance and 
honest management are two aspects which the market investors, whether individuals or 
institutions, would watch for. Therefore, allowing market participants to examine the 
determine the value of each shop in the BHC mall avoids some of the difficulties and 
conflicts of interest that directors and officers of the large bank holding companies may 
be experiencing.  
 
Even if the service company’s directors and officers hold a sway over the shops in the 
mall, their influence will be reduced by additional directors, the markets’ judgment and 
the information that market participants may find easier to digest. After all, information 
about each shop will be less complex and far more informative than the information of all 
shops bunched together under the umbrella of a BHC. 
 
Will the amount of available information about a restructured BHC be greater? 
Will information cost more and too much? The answer is: Perhaps; but not by much. 
Mutual fund advisers, who manage many funds, do well even though they must disclose 
the information about each fund separately.45 With the development of on-line 
information, its cost is falling and is very likely to continue to fall. Besides, the shops 
produce information that the BHC is currently providing the public investors. When 
information about the BHC is less important, it can be reduced and compensate for the 
information about each of the former subsidiaries of the BHC.  
 
Third, this proposal reduces the enormous power-concentration of BHCs’ 
managements and its regulators. Let us reverse the power structure. The time has come 
to reduce it. Bank holding companies and their management will have no power over any 
of the various financial services in the mall. The units of these financial services, be they 
banks, insurance companies or mutual funds and broker-dealers, will have to raise their 
funds in the markets and enable the markets (not the managements of the BHCs) decide 
who performs better. In addition, restructure will be easier to introduce some barriers of 
conflicts of interest. Competition among the various shops in the mall, even if not 
compete, may reduce collaboration that produces so much conflicts of interest. 46   
                                                 
45 See Tamar Frankel and Ann Schwing, The Regulation of Money Market Funds@ 
46 Even though the restructure will not effectuate the Volcker Rule entirely, it may introduce incentives to 
follow it without regulation. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, sec. 619, § 13, 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. (124 Stat.) 1376, 1620-31 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (Supp. 
2011)) (Volcker Rule) (generally prohibiting banking entities from engaging in proprietary trading or 
having ownership interest in or sponsoring hedge funds or private equity funds) (generally effective 12 
months after issuance of final rules or July 21, 2012). 
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2. A number of serious contrary arguments to the proposal should be addressed 
 
First, what if each mall elects the same directors? After all, the first directors are 
usually chosen by the promoters, and thereafter, by the management whom the directors 
engage? That, indeed, may be possible. However, unlike initial entities that have come 
into existence by a promoter, in this case the units are already established, have 
personnel, a business, and shareholders will receive participations in ongoing concerns. 
Therefore, it may well be that the existing managers will induce shareholders to maintain 
their own position, which in this case may mean continuity. The market prices of their 
shares, however, may direct the units’ future performance. In fact, the breakup of a BHC 
colossus will create viable units, in contrast to units that have to be established. It is a 
unique initial public distribution of entities with business history. 
 
Second, arguably credit costs will rise with the dilution of the synergies from 
affiliates within a BHC structure. Perhaps! Yet affiliates within the BHC may offer 
chances for increased availability of sharing permissible information, while competing. In 
addition, as we have seen, arising from the rubble of too much credit offered to people 
who cannot afford to pay back their loans, there is a limit to the good that synergies may 
bring. Today, some synergies have been so intense as to destroy our financial system. 
Therefore, let us wait until the dust settles, and then find out whether there is a need for 
more credit and to whom. In addition, the BHC, in its position as a service company, can 
offer all the synergies that the various parts of the BHC mall and especially the banking 
part, need. In fact, the combined services may save the costs and reduce some of the 
duplication that is now practiced in the BHC. The new structure may reduce the 
“synergy” that is bringing confusion and complexity to BHC management. 
 
In addition, we may discover the extent to which the synergies under the new proposed 
structure are missing, and complement them by safety measures for the bank part of the 
mall. For example, the safety, which might be provided by the upcoming Basel III and 
other new capital requirements, could then be increased. However, these requirements 
have met with strong objections.47  
 
My answer is that there are doubts whether the Basel III measures will pass, and if 
they do how much good they will do. Thus, these alternatives may be welcome for the 
banks but not necessarily contradict the conversion of the BHC into a service company, 
owned by all the shops in the mall. 
 
Third, imagine a possible post-break-up scenarios. Is it possible that certain business 
lines currently ensconced in BHCs might not survive as stand-alone entities? What if 
bank lending that is often used as a marketing tool to get more lucrative I-banking 
                                                 
47 E.g., Deborah Solomon, Regulators Wrangle on Rules --- Geithner and EU Counterpart Diverge on 
Bank Capital, Compensation Caps, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2011, at C3, LEXIS, News Library, Wsj File 
(noting “intense behind-the-scenes lobbying by some large financial institutions opposed to any additional 
capital requirements”). 
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business will shrink or disappear?48 If traditional commercial banks must stand alone, 
what would banking services look like? What if private securities offerings would 
become cheaper than traditional lending by newly stand-alone banks? That might doom 
those standalone entities and raise borrowing costs.  
 
The answer to these arguments, based on possible scenarios, is that BHCs are not 
the only ones that offer bank services. There are 135249 stand-alone banks in this 
country and some are doing quite well. In fact, they are doing better than the BHCs 
colossus. To be sure, some banks are failing. But their failure does not shake the entire 
financial system. There are only some banks within the BHC.50  
 
Even if all their banking business disappeared, it is unclear that their service will be 
substituted by market private placement and that private placement as a source of credit is 
a bad alternative to some banks. It is more likely that other, new and fresh, banks will 
arise and serve better. 
 
Fourth, look at the successful and desirable vertically integrated auto 
manufacturers, energy firms and others! Why not aim at the same model for BHCs?  
 
I have no answer to this argument because I am not an expert in complex corporate 
management. All I can say is that the new structure should not preclude cooperation and 
joint ventures among the various units in the restructured complex. The suggestions can 
come from the units or from the service company or from outsiders. The restructure does 
not and should not preclude such cooperation.  
 
Fifth, arguably, if and so long as risks are appropriately segregated within the BHC 
subsidiaries, why is the restructure of the BHC better? Even if BHCs rely too heavily 
on intercompany financing within the BHC, and contaminating good asset pools with the 
liabilities of bad asset pools, why not address the issue more directly, with targeted 
regulation?  
 
This argument is powerful, but not as convincing as it looks. Most rules are not as 
strong as structure. Self-interest is too often stronger than rules that attempt to overcome 
it. Habits and patterns of behavior make it hard to change by rule. Large BHCs did not 
                                                 
48 Chuck Whitehead tells me that lending profits at commercial banks are razor-thin these days, 
49 Michael White/Meyer-Chatfield Report 3Q YTD BOLI Assets Continue to Climb, Favoring Hybrid 
Accounts, ABIA INS. NEWS, Jan. 25, 2012, http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/023BD09C-8647-40AB-
863A-55656D272CDE/74838/ABIA_Newsletter_Jan_25_12.pdf  (last visited May 24, 2012) (noting that 
“[m]ost banks are subsidiaries of bank holding companies”; of 6740 commercial banks and FDIC-
supervised savings banks, 1352, or 20.1%, are stand-alone banks). 
50 See Michael White/Meyer-Chatfield Report 3Q YTD BOLI Assets Continue to Climb, Favoring Hybrid 
Accounts, ABIA INS. NEWS, Jan. 25, 2012, http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/023BD09C-8647-40AB-
863A-55656D272CDE/74838/ABIA_Newsletter_Jan_25_12.pdf  (last visited May 24, 2012) (noting that 
“[m]ost banks are subsidiaries of bank holding companies”); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, 
Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 258 (2010) (“The biggest banks in the United States . . . are not 
stand-alone entities, but . . . bank holding companies . . . .”).  
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arise in a day and limits on risk did not flower quickly. In fact, they are flourishing today. 
Therefore, unless there is a structural change supported by market pressures, the chances 
are that people’s interaction, favoritism and fixed beliefs will overcome regulation and 
may make it increasingly harder to enforce. Moreover, innovations are the darlings of 
American culture, and even if they start by moving in the right direction they may end in 
a slippery slope, culminating in a disaster that can destroy our economy.  
 
An example of this type of regulation is Rule 3a-7 under the Investment Company Act.51 
This Rule allowed the designers of asset-backed securities to establish an entity that is 
part but not fully a mutual fund. Unless the entity which hold the loans that form the basis 
of the issued securities was exempt from the regulation of the Investment Company Act 
of 1940 they could not achieve the securitization goal. Therefore, after many 
examinations and individual exemptions the Securities and Exchange Commission 
promulgated a rule that exempted the Special Purpose Entities or Special Purpose 
Vehicles (SPVs), as they are called, from the applicability of the Act. The rule is long and 
detailed, designed to distinguish between the mutual funds and the SPVs.  However, the 
rule exempted the SPVs from section 12(d)(1) of the Investment Company Act.52 This 
section prohibited, with a very limited exemption, the creation of funds of funds of funds.  
 
The serious problem posed by these pyramids was noted in the 1920s and clearly 
described in the preamble to the Act;53 hence, the prohibition in section 12(d)(1). I 
maintain that one of the reasons for the worse losses and confusion of the asset-backed 
securities was the design of SPV pyramids. These SPVs accepted parts of the assets of 
other SPVs and issues securities based on these asset parts. Then innovators established 
other SPVs that accepted parts of assets of the second SPVs and caused the issuance of 
securities. There could be new SPVs that acquired parts of the assets of the second level 
SPVs that then issues securities. These SPVs of SPVs of SPVs produced numerous 
securities based on parts of the assets of parts of the assets of parts of the assets of the 
first SPVs that were the actual loans. Not only were there thousands of securities based 
on others, but they were based on nothing but others that held loans. The structures made 
it difficult to find out who owns what? A stream of income does not function by itself. It 
is made by people. In this case you have no idea who owes and promised to pay, the 
stream of income becomes anonymous, and little can be done when the promised stream 
of income dries up.  
 
This innovation was not prohibited, and thereafter no one shut the door for further 
innovations that no one would have permitted. Hence—good exemptions can become 
toxic. That is why we cannot rely on them alone. That is why a clear and understood 
structure must complement the rules. It is not as flexible as rules are.  
 
Sixth, generally, what is wrong with the current situation? Some banks operate solely 
as traditional lenders. Even if they're held as BHCs, they are not managing hedge funds 
                                                 
51 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (2011). 
52 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(1) (2006). 
53 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b)(4) (2006). 
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on the side. If markets value this current structure more, won't those types of entities have 
advantages over the proposed bank structures?  
 
My answer is that if the financial system were our playground I would like to try 
and use one existing structure and play it against a proposed new structure and 
examine the results. In fact, we might use games on the Internet that offer virtual life to 
discover the results. However, neither the games nor experiments can give us a reliable 
answer. Changes do not occur overnight; and their results must be tested. Our purpose is 
to reduce risk in playing with other people’s money. Our purpose is to change the BHCs’ 
culture and managements at the least cost. If so, then we must try to do that and examine 
the result as we go along and refine the results as their flaws may emerge. The one thing 
we should not do, in light of our recent experience, is to maintain the structure and 
culture of BHCs as they are today. 
 
Assuming that the proposed structure has to be changed, how should it be done? 
The regulators can command the restructure. Yet, dismantling huge organizations by 
outside command of regulators may not be optimal. In fact, when we examine past such 
commands they were done when the entire financial system was in shambles as it was in 
the 1920s and 1930s, and even then the structures were produced by negotiations between 
the government and the financial intermediaries such as the investment companies. Today 
the financial intermediaries including BHCs are far stronger and command the support of 
their regulators and significant part of Congress. Therefore, the chances of a restructure 
by law or regulators’ orders are slim. I believe that a change in the law is unnecessary. 
Restructure should be voluntary. 
 
In addition, the proposed restructure of a BHC can be achieved without a change in 
the current law or with minimal change (relating ot the service company). If a new 
such structure arises it can be established under the existing law and the bank regulators, 
the SEC and insurance regulators cannot legally prohibit the structure if the promoters 
comply with the current law. There is a need for a law that would prohibit such a 
structure to be passed. There is a slim chance for the passage of such a law.  
 
Thus, from a legal point of view the conversion is not as difficult as it might seem. 
Because the BHC holds the shares of each unit in the BHC-colossus, each shareholder of 
the BHC can receive a pro rata share of the units held by the BHC and these shares can 
be traded as the BHC shares were before the distribution. Internally, each unit will 
receive a pro rata share of the service company which the BHC will become.  
 
Seventh, there is a slim chance that a new entrepreneurial drive of BHC 
managements would press for a restructure. BHC managements seem to drive for a 
larger size of the enterprises. Even those who are not eager to manage large financial 
intermediaries are less eager to announce their more limited ambition. The FDIC and 
bankruptcy courts may have an impact on the restructure of some BHCs.54  
                                                 
54 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 201-217, 
2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. (124 Stat.) 1376, 1442-1520 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381-5394 (Supp. 2011)) (FDIC 
orderly liquidation authority); id. at § 202(c)(1), 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. (124 Stat.) at 1447 (codified at 12 
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Yet, the purpose of this proposal is not to wait until all BHCs pose danger to the 
financial system or fail at an enormous cost to the shareholders and the country. The 
purpose is to find a way to induce and produce such a restructure to prevent the failures. 
One source of inducement to restructure is the shareholders of the BHCs. That is 
especially so when the shareholders are institutions that hold significant number of BHC 
shares. There are situations, especially after the crash of 2008, in which large 
shareholders have managed to impose some changes on BHCs. However, these changes 
were usually in the form of personnel changes and the induced departure of the chairman 
of the board or the Chief Executive officer.55 There is a BHC, such as Citibank, that is 
divesting itself of some shops in its mall.56 There are other BHCs, such as Bank of 
America, which has gone the other way and acquired Merrill Lynch to its mall,57 and 
Wells Fargo, which has acquired Wachovia Bank.58 Neither has changed the power 
structure that is concentrated in the BHC.  
 
Eight, it is unclear whether all shareholders of all BHCs will rise to change their 
structure. Why should anyone who holds a significant power over billions of dollars 
give it up to become subservient to those whom he or she managed before? At first 
glance it would seem that the answer is: No one, especially no one who has managed the 
colossus before. If power is what the managers enjoy then the new proposed structure 
would mean to give that power up. There are however, two situations in which such 
restructure may occur. One is after a BHC has demonstrated danger to the system. In 
such a case the FDIC has the authority to restructure the entire complex.59  
                                                                                                                                                 
U.S.C. § 5382(c)(1) (Supp. 2011)) (applying Bankruptcy Code to bank holding companies other than 
companies covered under liquidation authority for which FDIC has been appointed as receiver); id. at 
202(c)(1)  (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5382(c)(2) (Supp. 2011)) (applying .liquidation authority provisions to 
bank holding companies covered under liquidation authority for which FDIC has been appointed as 
receiver). 
 
55 See, e.g., Pallavi Gogoi, BoA CEO Lewis Plans to Step Down; Bank Under Fire from Merrill Lynch 
Deal, USA TODAY, Oct. 1, 2009, at 1B, LEXIS, Newes Library, Arcnws Library (noting that shareholders 
voted for CEO’s departure and departure was “hailed” by shareholder First American Funds).  
56 See CITI, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 33, 
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/investor/quarterly/2012/ar11c_en.pdf?ieNocache=141(last visited June 12, 
2012)  (“Key divestitures in 2010 included The Student Loan Corporation, Primerica, auto loans, the 
Canadian Mastercard business and U.S. retail sales finance portfolios.”); id. 153-55 (summarizing 
divestitures in 2009, 2010, and 2011); CITI, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 178-81, 
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/investor/quarterly/2011/ar10c_en.pdf?ieNocache=687 (last visited June 12, 
2012) (summarizing divestitures in 2008, 2009, and 2010). 
57BANK OF AMERICA, ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 1455, http://media.corporate-
ir.net/media_files/irol/71/71595/reports/2010_AR.pdf (last visited June 12, 2012) (noting Jan. 1, 2009 
acquisition of Merrill Lynch). WELLS FARGO & CO. ANNUAL REPORT 2008,,at 100, 
https://www.wellsfargo.com/downloads/pdf/invest_relations/wf2008annualreport.pdf (last visited June 12, 
2012) (noting Dec. 31, 2008 acquisition of Wachovia).  
58 WELLS FARGO & CO. ANNUAL REPORT 2008,,at 100, 
https://www.wellsfargo.com/downloads/pdf/invest_relations/wf2008annualreport.pdf (last visited June 12, 
2012) (noting Dec. 31, 2008 acquisition of Wachovia).  
59 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 201-217, 2010 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (124 Stat.) 1376, 1442-1520 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381-5394 (Supp. 2011)) (FDIC 
orderly liquidation authority).  
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In addition, if a manager seeks not only power over others, but also the power of 
beginning something new and more prosperous; if a manager seeks  leadership of a 
structure which governments and perhaps other managements and regulators would 
follow, a structure which demonstrate solutions to so many problems without legislation 
and new added regulation. A leader, who fights regulation, can then show that the 
markets and the management can solve the problems without government interference. 
Then perhaps one or two such leaders will arise and demonstrate how this structure can 
lead to a different and far more stable and successful BHC. Initiative to establish such a 
BHC should come from the private sector rather than be imposed by law or regulation. 
Investors should flock to this structure, if well explained. I hope there are entrepreneurs 
who would try and investors who might be interested. I see that the new CEO of Citi is 
attempting to change its structure.60    
 
Finally, do we need to resurrect the Glass Steagall Act? 
 
This question arises almost instantly when one views the proposed structure. Yet the 
answer is not necessarily limited to the Glass Steagall Act. It may well be that future laws 
should focus not on the units’ functions but on the relationships between and among 
different types of financial intermediaries. It may well be that the next legal issues will 
involve the issues of cooperation – relaxing prohibitions on antitrust activities.61 Or the 
problems might arise in areas that we do not now envision. Regulators should follow 
rather than impose their particular view of structures. They should focus on problems that 
arise from new structures and should follow the operations of the structures and the 
problems they pose. Regulations and law in general should analyze and focus on 
problems and their solutions. The problems may arise from new beneficial structures as 
well as from old ones. 
 
                                                 
60 Susanne Kapner, Citi’s CEO Is Keeping Score, Wall St. J. March 5, 2013. at C1 C-2. 
61 Barring an exemption, the antitrust laws are applicable to banking. See, e.g., United States v.  
Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 337 n.12 (1963) (banking is “commerce” under the Clayton Act); 
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 270, 275 (2007) (in the securities law 
context, courts must decide “whether . . . there is a ‘clear repugnancy’ between the securities law 
and the antitrust complaint,” or “whether the two are “clearly incompatible.’”); 15 U.S.C. § 
19(a)(1) (prohibited interlocking directorates and officers does not apply to “banks, banking 
associations, and trust companies.”);  
See also 12 USCS § 1467a(e)], 12 U.S.C. 1828(c)), (1842) (with exception relating to 12 USCS § 
1843(k)] and 12 USCS § 1842; A joint venture could be a violation of the antitrust laws as a 
“contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce,” 15 U.S.C. § 1, an act that would “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine 
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations ,” 15 U.S.C. § 2, or an acquisition of stock of 
another company whose effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
monopoly,” 15 U.S.C. § 18. In determining whether a joint venture constitutes a violation, courts 
will look to factors including risk-sharing and integration of activities. Ilene Knable Gotts, Health 
Care Joint Ventures and the Antitrust laws: A Guardedly Optimistic Prognosis, 10 J. Contemp. 
Health L. & Pol'y 169, 173-75 (1994) (citing cases). 
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The December edition of the Economist, entitled “The world in 2013” had a notation on 
”The Fall of the Universal Bank.” “The writer suggests that the large banks, such as 
Citibank and others will shrink. “The power of universal banks will be eroded by market 
forces. . . In 2013 most universal banks will continue to narrow their focus.” 62 It is 
recognized that banks have moved too closely towards “transaction banking” and too 
further away from “relationship banking,” that is intermediation and servicing lenders. 
Translated into legal terms there was too strong a movement toward market fund raising 
and trading on the institutional BHC account, and too little intermediation--deposit 
money-raising and contract lending.63 Banks were designed to intermediate between 
savers and borrowers. They were not designed to trade in the savers’ money and increase 
the rewards to the traders and their managers. These rewards belong to the savers—not to 
the traders. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This Article does not offer a detailed blueprint of restructuring BHCs. Neither does it 
suggest that market discipline alone can control occasional but horrendous violations and 
risk-taking by BHCs.  
 
However, while BHCs are shrinking, they are not restructuring.64 We need combined 
controls, including regulatory controls and structural controls. Markets and regulations 
can be strengthened by the proposed structure to produce a more stable financial system 
that can be reined-in. Let us add to the structure the right people that may render our 
system more stable and more fruitful. An effective structure can help attract these 
persons. Therefore, un-concentrated power is perhaps the most important aspect of 
restructuring BHCs. It not only reduces control over a very large pool other people’s 
money but also restricts the controllers’ choice over the kind of regulation and regulators.  
.  
 
One virtue of converting BHC into a service company is that to limit the BHC’s 
concentrated power, while allowing cooperation and interaction among the different 
financial services. It would also reduce if not eliminate the inherent conflict of interest 
that BHCs pose when trading for the Institutional account. This restructure will eliminate 
the need for name rules including the Volker rule but may require changes in the antitrust 
laws. To be sure, management of the service company can continue to benefit some shops 
in the mall rather than others. It can continue to negotiate benefits that are too high for 
some that do not deserve the rewards, and discriminate against others. But its power to do 
                                                 
62 Lionel Barber, at 142 
63 Id. 
64 Todd Karpovich; Daily Record Business Writer, The Daily Record Co.  The Daily Record (Baltimore, 
MD.), August 15, 2000, Tuesday. First Union, 6th largest bank holding company is shrinking by cutting out 
jobs. The bank was taking $3.7 billion charges in debt and severance packages. . . . Bank of America 
spokeswoman . . . said Maryland will be affected by the cuts. . . "Every state in our franchise is going to be 
affected," Earlier this month, Bank of America announced that William Couper was taking over as 
president of Bank of America Greater Washington, after serving as president of the Baltimore region. John 
Morton III, the bank's Mid-Atlantic president, took over Couper's position as president of Bank of America 
Greater Baltimore. 
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so will be more limited. Regulation and market ownership of the particular former 
subsidiaries are likely to induce the services to follow the market and regulatory 
judgment and refocus on justifiable services.  
 
Who might wish to follow this model?  
 
There are prominent leaders in the large banking community that advocate breaking up 
the large banks. They find it difficult to do, as the Citi’s experience has been showing and 
reported.65 Legal, structural, and personal objections have added problems. So have 
power and personal egos.  Nonetheless, there are counter-pressures. As Wall Street 
Journal reported, Investors have sought to split J.P. Morgan top posts with the support of 
the employees’ inion.66 
 
Different promoters might be attracted to the new structure. Perhaps a manager of a 
current BHC, who seeks a fresh structure, ability to control risk better, and desires to 
attract investors. To be sure, such a manager may hope for a strong position as well as 
assured better rewards. With the restructure, a manager may indeed start in a position at 
many of the more promising and profitable financial shops. There is no reason why the 
shops would not appoint strong candidates, who commit to their success.  
 
The restructure would create additional positions on boards and hopefully attract able 
directors. Retention of power but distribution of burdens may be attractive to a current 
leader of a large BHC. An opportunity of leading the way in a bold step may also be a 
drawing card, especially if the restructure is supported by at least some regulators, such 
as the FDIC, and some legislators as well. The proliferation of boards and directors may 
raise costs. However, the costs might be contained by the need to show profits to the 
markets.  
 
Another group of potential promoters is large funds that may find the structure more 
attractive and in some cases more familiar. These can include banks or broker-dealers or 
entrepreneurs or private equity funds who might be interested in acquiring and designing 
structures which are similar to the one proposed in this Article.  
 
Lionel Barber’s of The Economist has predicted a similar process. “In 2013, money and 
talent will go elsewhere” marking the beginning of the end of the universal bank.67 It 
seems that the bank regulators have woken up. There is a “raging debate over the risk big 
lenders pose,” Wall Street Journal reported. The Federal Reserve board has told a large 
bank holding company “not to pursue more major deals.”68 Even if this is not a regulatory 
command it could be a mild suggestion that may go a long way. In fact, some BHC are 
reducing their size as a measure of cost-cutting.69 And investors seek to split BHC 
                                                 
65  WS Journal Feb. 21, 2013 C1, C2. 
66 Id. at C3. 
67 Lionel Barber, at 145. 
68 WALL Street J. December 12, 2012 at C1-C2.  
69 Barclays I Set to Join Cost-Cutting Crowd, WALL Street J. December 13, 2012. at C8. 
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management.70 And yet, the tangle that was created in years cannot be untangled in a 
short time.71 It took time to develop these giants and it will take time to restructure them. 
But it seems that the first steps have already being taken. 
                                                 
70 Investors Seek to Split J.P. Morgan Top Posts, WALL Street J. February 21, 2013. at C3 
71 Susan Kapner, Citi Set in Stone? Looking Like It, Financial Giants deflect Breakup Talk, WALL Street 
Journal,  February 21, 2013, at C1-C2. 
